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tion because contracts between the entities and the U.S. already do
that. The court held that the SRBA court did not err in denying this
request because the SRBA court specifically stated, "ownership of this
water right is derived from law and is not based exclusively on the contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and the irrigation organizations."
Thus, the court remanded the decision of the district court in part,
with an order to substitute the court's remark, and affirmed the decision in part.
Matthew Willson
MAINE
FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 2007 ME 97,
926 A.2d 1197 (affirming the State Board of Environmental Protection's denial of water quality certification for a water storage project
where the Board's interpretation of the statutory requirements of certification was reasonable, and therefore, entitled to deference).
FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC ("FPL"), which owns and operates
the Flagstaff Storage Project on the Dead River in Somerset and Franklin Counties, appealed a Superior Court judgment that affirmed the
Board of Environmental Protection's ("Board") denial of water quality
certification. The Board is the reviewing body within the Department
of Environmental Protection ("Department"), the agency in Maine
responsible for water quality. Although the Department initially approved certification on FPL's application for the Flagstaff Project, the
Board ultimately vacated the Department's decision and denied the
water quality certification. FPL appealed to the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine after the Superior Court affirmed the Board's decision,
and held the Board's interpretation of the standards for water quality
review were entitled to deference.
FPL based its appeal on three arguments: (1) when the Board
failed to act on the application within a one-year statutory deadline,
the Department waived the certification requirement; (2) the Board
analyzed water quality with an incorrect standard; and (3) the Board
erred in concluding the Flagstaff Storage Project did not meet the correct Class C water quality standard. FPL premised each argument on
the Board's misinterpretation of the applicable Maine statute, and in
each case, the court held that where the agency's interpretations were
reasonable, supported by the plain language of the statute, or otherwise consistent with legislative intent, the Board's decision was entitled
to deference.
After reviewing the statute's legislative history, the court held that
the Board acted consistent with the legislative intent and was not a
waiver of the certification requirement. Although the statute did not
define "act on," the legislative history revealed that the purpose of the
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statute was to prevent denial by way of delay rather than by substantive
decision. Here, there was no indication that the Board attempted to
deny certification by way of procedural delay. Further, the court held
that the statute was silent in defining "act on"; therefore, the Board's
interpretation was reasonable.
The court held that the Board exercised proper discretion in its interpretation of the relevant statute. On review of the Department's
initial approval of FPL's water quality certification, the Board found
the Department had employed a new standard for assessing water quality, bypassing the relevant Maine statutory requirements for approval of
the new standard. Specifically, the Department analyzed the Flagstaff
Storage Project application with an impoundment-to-impoundment
standard, comparing a storage reservoir to another storage reservoir,
rather than to a natural lake standard. The Board reversed the Department's certification because the Department was required to receive EPA approval before changing the natural lake standard to the
lesser impoundment-to-impoundment standard, which it failed to do.
The court reviewed the legislative intent, which indicated a desire to
change the standard, but found that it did not exempt the Department
from obtaining EPA approval. The court held that the Board's interpretation of the statute's plain language was reasonable to utilize the
natural lake standard as a baseline for all water quality certifications.
Finally, the court held that the Board's expertise in environmental
concerns and experience in administering those provisions enabled
the Board to interpret the relevant statutes reasonably. FPL argued
that regardless of the certification standard used, the Flagstaff Storage
Project achieved the required water quality standards as a matter of law
because as a hydropower project, it did not discharge any pollutant.
The Board found this position inconsistent with a long line of state and
federal holdings that waters from hydropower projects do constitute
discharges subject to environmental regulation. The court affirmed
the Board's decision after determining that the Board's interpretation
of the statutes was reasonable.
Jeff McGaughran
NEVADA
Walker v. United States, 2007-NMSG-038, 142 N.M. 45, 162 P.3d
882 (holding that the right to graze livestock on federal land is not
implicit in a vested water right or a right-of-way used to convey the water associated with a vested water right).
Cattle Ranchers ("Walkers") brought a takings claim against the
United States after the Forest Service terminated a grazing permit for
overgrazing-related deterioration of the allotment. The Walkers
brought suit in the United States Court of Claims ("Claims Court")
after the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico

